In state-of-the-art e-voting systems, a bulletin board (BB) is a critical component for preserving election integrity and availability. Although it is common in the literature to assume that a BB is a centralized entity that is trusted, in the recent works of Culnane and Schneider [CSF 2014] and Chondros et al. [ICDCS 2016], the importance of removing BB as a single point of failure has been extensively discussed. Motivated by these works, we introduce a framework for the formal security analysis of the BB functionality. Our framework treats a secure BB as a robust public transaction ledger, defined by Garay et al. [Eurocrypt 2015], that additionally supports the generation of receipts for successful posting. Namely, in our model, a secure BB system achieves Persistence and Liveness that are confirmable, in the sense that any malicious behavior of the BB system can be detected via a verification mechanism. As a case study for our framework, we analyze the BB system of Culnane and Schneider and point out its weaknesses. We demonstrate an attack revealing that the said system does not achieve Confirmable Liveness, even in the case where the adversary is computationally bounded and covert, i.e., it may deviate from the protocol specification but does not want to be detected. In addition, we show that special care should be taken for the choice of the underlying cryptographic primitives, so that the claimed fault tolerance threshold of N/3 out-of N corrupted peers is preserved. Next, based on our analysis, we introduce a new BB protocol that upgrades the [CSF 2014] protocol. We prove that it tolerates any number less than N/3 out-of N corrupted peers both for Persistence and Confirmable Liveness, against a computationally bounded general Byzantine adversary.
Introduction
An electronic voting (e-voting) system is a salient instance of a network protocol where verifying the correctness of the execution is of critical importance. One can argue that if the concerned parties can not agree on the election transcript, then the voting process itself is meaningless. Furthermore, besides e-voting, verifiability of the execution is a desired feature in several other cases, such as auctions and blockchain transactions, to name a few.
It becomes apparent that in any protocol where consensus on the outcome is essential, the protocol infrastructure must guarantee a consistent view to all involved parties as far as auditing is concerned. Consistency here informally suggests that any two auditors engaging in the verification process on the same input but from possibly different network locations, should agree on their verdict, i.e. they both accept or reject the execution outcome. If this guarantee cannot be provided, then an adversary controlling the network traffic could easily partition the parties into small "islands", such that each island has access to a partial, and possibly (partially) fake, view of the execution. By doing this, the adversary can undermine the auditors' consensus on the outcome. This matter has been extensively studied by Barak et al. [5] , where it is shown that parties communicating via non-authenticated channels are unavoidably prone to such "isolation" attacks.
When it comes to voting, consistency may be realized in various ways depending on the election setting. For instance, in small-scale elections (e.g. board elections) a consistent view can be achieved by executing a consensus protocol by the voters themselves, even without encrypting the votes if privacy is not a concern. However, when considering the large scale setting (e.g., national elections) where complete connectivity among the participants is unrealistic, a publicly accessible and reliable method is required for posting and reading all necessary election information. This is provided by an electronic bulletin board (BB) which, abstractly, encompasses two types of operations: 1) a posting operation involving users who make post requests for items of their choice, potentially subject to some access policy, and a subsystem of item collectors (ICs) that receive and store the submitted items. 2) A publishing operation, where the IC subsystem publishes the stored items on an audit board (AB) from where any party can read. Depending on the implementation, the IC and the AB could be distributed or centralized, or even managed by the same physical entity. Nonetheless, the above generic description typifies the way BB's are treated in the e-voting literature.
By the discussion so far, it is of high importance that the BB functionality implemented by the IC and AB should function as an immutable database, so that once submitted, items could not be erased or changed. The desired features of such a database include: (a) the ability to authenticate item contributors, (b) distributed operation so as to protect against attacks on availability, (c) a predetermined time-span where item submission is enabled, (d) resilience to any modification so as to facilitate verifiability.
The necessity of a consistent BB has been stressed many times in e-voting literature. In his PhD thesis, Benaloh [6] assumes BBs with append-only write operations for auditing, also stressing out that "implementing such bulletin boards may be a problem unto itself." Subsequently, most verifiable e-voting systems proposed (e.g. [23, 17, 13, 31, 15, 2, 14, 10, 7, 32] ) refer to the notion of BB as a fundamental component of their infrastructure without explicitly realizing it.
Despite the widely accepted critical importance of building reliable BBs for e-voting, the literature on proposals of secure and efficient BB constructions is scarce. Outside a limited number of early works [39, 21, 38, 29, 33] , the most concrete examples include the BB applied in the vVote e-voting system [20] (cf. [18, 11] ) and the BB of the D-DEMOS Internet-voting (i-voting) system [16] . In all these cases, the introduced BB was either an integral part of a specific e-voting system [21, 16] , or, even though modular, lacked formal treatment under a comprehensive security model [39, 38, 33, 29, 20] .
In this work, we focus on the functionality of the BB as used in e-voting systems, yet we note that our approach can be extended to other applications where a public reliable auditing system is needed. We aim to establish a complete formal treatment of a BB and propose an efficient and provably secure construction that can be deployed in a wide class of e-voting designs.
Initially, we are motivated by the security requirements proposed by Culnane and Schneider [20] , suggesting that a secure BB should prevent data injection and removal, while allowing only the publishing of non-clashing items. On top of these properties, [20] prescribes a liveness guarantee of the eventual publishing of all submitted items for which a receipt of correct recording has been generated. Taking a step further, we introduce a framework for the formal study of the BB concept and its security. Our framework is inspired by (i) the notion of a robust public transaction ledger (RPTL) defined by Garay et al. [24] and (ii) the security model presented by Chondros et al. [16] , thereby utilizing the connection between blockchain and BB systems, which, albeit being folklore, was never formally exploited. We formalize a secure BB system in a way that it can be seen as an RPTL that additionally supports the generation of receipts for successful posting. Expanding the security model for blockchain protocols of [24] , we divide security into two properties named Persistence and Confirmable Liveness. Confirmability in liveness captures the receipt generation capability. Persistence can also be Confirmable, meaning that dishonest AB behavior is detectable via verification of published data.
Next, we apply our framework for the security analysis of the BB system of [20] , which we refer to as the CS BB system, that utilizes standard signature and threshold signature schemes (TSS) as cryptographic building blocks. In the threat model of [20] , an adversary may corrupt less than N c /3 out-of the total N c IC peers, hence we also assume this fault-tolerance threshold.
Our findings reveal that CS is not secure in our framework for the < N c /3 threshold. Specifically, we demonstrate an explicit attack showing that CS with N c IC peers does not achieve Confirmable Liveness. Our attack falls outside the threat model [20] but raises an interesting discussion about its plausibility. In particular, the threat model of [20] relies on a presumed "fear of detection" (cf. the full version of [20] , [19, Section 8] ), to exclude certain adversarial protocol deviations in the IC subsystem. Nevertheless, such covert type of security reasoning, cf. [3] , is never formalized or implemented in [19] and in fact, as our attack demonstrates, the detection of protocol deviation is impossible by the IC peers themselves given their local protocol view.
A second, though less crucial, finding for the security of CS concerns its Confirmable Persistence guarantees. Namely, we show that in order for CS to achieve Confirmable Persistence under the < N c /3 fault tolerance threshold, the underlying TSS should not be applied as 'black-box' and that care should be taken for the choice of the TSS construction. By describing a specific attack, we show that when the TSS robustness condition analyzed in [26] is invoked for liveness, then a smaller fault threshold of < N c /4 must be assumed. On the positive side, we show that there are constructions (e.g. the TSS in [41] , or the "trivial" TSS consisting of N c standard signatures) suitable for CS that respect the < N c /3 threshold for Confirmable Persistence.
Based on our analysis, we modify CS by designing a new Publishing protocol that achieves consensus among the honest IC peers on the posted items that should be published. Combined with the CS Posting protocol, we obtain a new BB system that achieves both Persistence and Confirmable Liveness for < N c /3 corrupted IC peers. The new BB system is secure against (i) a general computationally bounded Byzantine adversary, (ii) in a partially synchronous setting (cf. [22] ), where the message delivery delay and the synchronization loss among the entities' clocks are bounded, but the bounds need not to be known for the entities' engagement in the BB system.
Summary of Contributions. Our contributions are as follows:
-Introduction of the first complete framework for the formal study of e-voting BBs captured by the properties of Confirmable Liveness and (Confirmable) Persistence. -Analysis of the CS BB system [20] in our security framework that reveals two vulnerabilities.
In particular, one of the vulnerabilities challenges the reasoning of liveness in the threat model provided in [19, Sec. 8] .
-A suitably modified variant of the CS protocol that restores Confirmable Liveness and we prove secure in our framework with an N c /3 threshold for the IC subsystem against computationally bounded Byzantine adversaries. In particular, (i) Persistence holds in the asynchronous model and can be also Confirmable assuming honest majority between AB peers, while (ii) Confirmable Liveness holds in the partially synchronous model.
Related work
The BB functionality as component of e-voting systems. In a wide range of state-of-theart e-voting systems (e.g., [31, 15, 2, 14, 10, 42, 32] ), the BB is a centralized single point of failure for security analysis. Dini [21] proposed a distributed e-voting service based on [23] , focusing on the service in general rather on the BB system. Several works on distributed e-voting BB solutions lacked formal security analysis, providing only constructions without proof [38, 40, 29, 33] , a study of requirements [28] or being applicable only to the kiosk-voting based setting [7] . D-DEMOS [16] is a distributed internet-voting system which adopts [32] to the distributed setting. The security in [16] is studied in a model that is a stepping stone for our framework, yet security argumentation targets specifically the D-DEMOS requirements. The CS BB system [20] is a reference point for our work, and will be analyzed in Section 5.
Robust public transaction ledgers. In a recently emerged line of research, transaction ledgers used in blockchain applications have been studied under formal cryptographic models. Garay et al. [24] formalize robust public transaction ledgers (RPTLs) that satisfy (i) Persistence, i.e., honest parties agree on their report of transactions published in the ledger in an appendonly manner and (ii) Liveness, i.e., all transactions in the local view of the honest parties will be eventually reported. Moreover, they prove that Nakamoto's Bitcoin blockchain protocol [35] is an RPTL in a synchronous setting. Taking a step further, Pass et al. [36] prove the robustness of Bitcoin blockchain protocol, even when the network is semi-synchronous, i.e., the adversary can impose bounded delays. Very recently, Garay et al. [25] introduce a dynamic setting that reflects most real-world scenarios where the number of involved parties may vary over time, while Badertscher et al. [4] prove the security of Bitcoin as an RPTL in the universal composability framework [12] . A responsive consensus protocol is one that achieves "instant" confirmation of transactions (i.e., dependent only on network delay), and it is shown in [37] , that such protocols exist only assuming a 1/3 bound on the adversary. As a side observation, our protocol matches this bound and this level of responsiveness in the permissioned setting (while [37] is in the permissionless setting) and can be seen as a responsive permissioned distributed ledger. We note that the permissionless setting is not immediately relevant to e-voting, since in e-voting, we need to explicitly permission write access so that it is consistent with the e-voting semantics (e.g., the one voter -one vote principle).
Preliminaries
We use κ as the security parameter. We write f (κ) = negl(κ) if function f is negligible in κ, and PPT for probabilistic polynomial-time. We denote [N ] := {1, 2, . . . , N } for any N ∈ N.
Signature schemes. A signature scheme DS = (KGen, Sig, Vf) consists of the following PPT algorithms: (i) the key generation algorithm KGen generates a keypair (pk, sk) ← KGen(1 κ ) for a secret signing key sk and a public verification key pk; (ii) the signing algorithm Sig returns, on input a message m and a signing key sk, a signature σ ← Sig sk (m); (iii) the verification algorithm Vf returns, given pk, a message m and signature σ, a bit b ← Vf pk (m, σ).
The correctness of DS requires that for each (pk, sk) ∈ KGen(1 κ ) and a valid message m, it must hold that Vf pk (m, Sig sk (m)) = 1. The security of DS is formalized via the notion of existential unforgeability against chosen message attacks (EUFCMA, [27] ). For a more detailed description of EUFCMA security, cf. Appendix A.1.
Threshold signature schemes. Let t s < N be two positive integers and P 1 , . . . , P N a set of peers. A (non-interactive) threshold signature scheme (TSS) TSS = (DistKeygen, ShareSig, ShareVerify, Combine, TVf) is a tuple of the following five efficient algorithms: (i) the distributed key generation algorithm DistKeygen(1 κ , t s , N ) generates a keypair (tsk i , pk i ) for each peer P i and a public key pk, such that exactly t s + 1 secret keys tsk i are required to recover the secret key tsk corresponding to pk. The public output is pk together with a tuple of verification keys (pk 1 , . . . , pk N ); (ii) the signing algorithm ShareSig tsk i (m) returns a signature share σ i of the message m; (iii) the share verification algorithm ShareVerify(pk, pk 1 , . . . , pk N , m, (i, σ i )) outputs 1 iff σ i is the valid ith signature share of m; (iv) the share combining algorithm Combine(pk, pk 1 , . . . , pk N , m, (i, σ i ) i∈S ), given a subset of t s + 1 valid signature shares on m, outputs a full signature σ ← TSign(tsk, m) on m; (v) the verification algorithm TVf pk (m, σ) outputs 0 or 1, depending on whether σ is a valid signature of m.
The correctness of TSS requires that for a vector (tsk, pk, tsk 1 , . . . , tsk N , pk 1 , . . . , pk N ) output by DistKeygen(1 κ , t s , N ), if S ⊆ [N ] s.t. |S| = t s + 1, it holds that (i) σ i = ShareSig tsk i (m), and (ii) if σ = Combine(pk, pk 1 , . . . , pk N , m, (i, σ i ) i∈S ), then ShareVerify(pk, pk 1 , . . . , pk N , m, (i, σ i )) = 1 for i ∈ S and TVf pk (m, σ) = 1.
TSS is existentially (t s , N )-unforgeable against chosen-message attacks ((t s , N )-EUFCMAsecure) if every PPT adversary A has negl(κ) advantage in performing a successful EUFCMA forgery for a message m * , even when the sum of (i) the number of the parties A corrupts, and (ii) the number of parties for which A made a signing query for m * , is no more than t s . We write Adv tss A (κ, t s , N ) to denote A's advantage in breaking the (t s , N )-EUFCMA-security of TSS. For a more detailed description of (t s , N )-EUFCMA security, cf. Appendix A.2.
TSS is said to be (t s , N )-robust, if A controlling t s peers, cannot prevent honest peers from creating a valid signature. Robustness can only be achieved for t s < N/2, see Gennaro et al. [26] .
Framework
We introduce a formal framework for secure e-voting BB systems. First, we provide an abstract description of the consisting entities and protocols. Then, building upon the requirements stated in [20] and the modeling approach of [16] and [24] , we formalize BB security via the notions of (Confirmable) Persistence and Confirmable Liveness.
Syntax of a bulletin board system
Entities. A BB system involves the following entities: 1) a setup authority SA that generates the setup information and initializes all other entities with their private inputs; 2) the users that submit post requests for items of their choice. An item can be any data the user intends to be published, e.g., the voters' ballots, the election results or any necessary audit information.; 3) a subsystem of item collection (IC) peers P 1 , . . . , P Nc that are responsible for (i) interacting with the users for posting all submitted items, and (ii) interacting with the AB (see below) to publish the recorded items; 4) a subsystem of audit board (AB) peers AB 1 , . . . , AB Nw where all the posted items are published.
Setup. At the preparation period, SA specifies a posting policy P = (Accept, Select(·)), where 1) Accept = {(U, x)} is a binary relation over pairs of user IDs and items. For a user U that wants to post item x, (U, x) ∈ Accept is a check the IC peers execute to initiate interaction with U for posting x. E.g., a user that is authenticated as a voter may be accepted to post a vote but not some public data (e.g., public encryption key). 2) Select(·) is a selection function over sets of items defined as follows: let X U be the set of published items associated with posts from user U . Then, Select(X U ) ⊆ X U contains all valid published items posted by U , resolving any conflict among clashing items. E.g., in Estonian e-voting [30] , if a voter U submitted multiple votes then only the last one must count. Thus, if the votes were submitted in time ascending order as x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x m , then we set
The SA initializes the other entities with the description of P. Next, all entities engage in a setup interaction such that when finalized, each entity has a private input (e.g., a signing key or an authentication password) and some public parameters params.
BB protocols. The BB functionality comprises the Posting and Publishing protocols, accompanied by two verification algorithms: (i) VerifyRec, run by the users to verify the successful posting of their items, and (ii) VerifyPub, run by any party for auditing the validity of the data on the AB.
The Posting protocol is initiated by a user U that on private input s U submits a post request for item x. Namely, U uses s U to generate a credential cr U 5 . Then, the user and the IC peers engage in an interaction that results in U obtaining a receipt rec[x] for the successful posting of x. Upon receiving rec[x], and using public election parameters params, U may run the algorithm VerifyRec on input (rec[x], x, s U , params), that either accepts or rejects.
In the Publishing protocol, the IC peers upload their local records of posted items to the AB subsystem. The protocol may encompass a consensus protocol among the AB peers to agree whether a local record is admissible. In addition, any auditor may run VerifyPub on input params and (a subset of the) published data to check AB consistency.
Introducing our security framework
In [20] , Culnane and Schneider propose a list of four properties that a secure BB must satisfy:
(bb.1). Only items that have been posted may appear on the AB. This property expresses safety against illegitimate data injection. (bb.2). Any item that has a valid receipt must appear on the AB. (bb. 3) . No clashing items must both appear on the AB. (bb.4). Once published, no items can be removed from the AB. According to this property, the AB subsystem is an append-only posting site.
In this section, we integrate the above four properties into a formal security framework. At a high level, our framework conflates the formal approach in distributed e-voting security of Chondros et al. [16] with the notion of a robust public transaction ledger (RPTL) proposed by Garay et al. [24] . Namely, we view a secure BB as an RPTL that additionally provides receipts of successful posting for honestly submitted items. The security properties of an RPTL stated in [24] are informally expressed as follows: • Persistence: once an honest peer reports an item x as posted, then all honest peers will either (i) agree on the AB position that x should be published, or (ii) not report x. • θ-Liveness: honest peers will report honestly submitted items within some delay bound θ. Introducing Confirmable θ-Liveness. In the e-voting scenario, we require that the honest users will eventually get a receipt when engaging at the Posting protocol. Consequently, we introduce the Confirmable θ-Liveness property, suggesting that any honest user that submits an item x, will obtain a valid receipt for x within time θ, and x will be published on the AB.
The conflict between Confirmable Liveness and property (bb.3). An important observation is that Confirmable Liveness and (bb.3) cannot be satisfied concurrently if we assume that honest users may submit post requests for clashing items (e.g., in Estonian e-voting [30] , as a coercion countermeasure, voters may vote multiple times and only the last counts). To resolve this conflict, we make the following relaxation: we do not require that (bb.3) holds, by allowing every successfully posted item to be published. Then, we specify the subset of valid published items for each user via the selection function Select(·) over the set of published items; the description of Select(·) depends on the election setting. Note that in the special case where we restrict the honest users from submitting clashing items, we can match (bb.3) by fixing Select(·) to be the identity function.
Introducing (Confirmable) Persistence. Given the above, to encompass (bb.1) and (bb.4), we introduce the notion of Persistence where conflict resolution is achieved by applying Select(·) on the AB view. Persistence as defined in [24] captures the "unremovability" property (bb.4). To also capture (bb.1), we require that in a setting where t c out-of N c IC peers are corrupted, an item x posted by U will not be reported as valid, if at least t c + 1 honest IC peers did not record x at some Posting protocol execution. Note that if we require a threshold of less than t c + 1 honest IC peers to be unaware of item x, then (bb.1) becomes unrealistic, as in most distributed systems, an adversary that corrupts t c peers can block t c honest peers, and run the execution jointly with the rest N c − 2t c honest peers.
Furthermore, we extend Persistence by taking into account a AB subsystem that is fully controlled by the adversary. This is formalized by the Confirmable Persistence property, where we require that any malicious AB behavior will be detected via the VerifyPub algorithm.
System clocks. Like in [16] , we assume that there exists a global clock variable Clock ∈ N, and that every system entity X is equipped with an internal clock variable Clock[X] ∈ N. We define the following two events: • The event Init(X): Clock[X] ← Clock, that initializes X by synchronizing its internal clock with the global clock. Synchronicity and message delay. We parameterize our threat model by (i) an upper bound δ on the delay of message delivery, and (ii) an upper bound ∆ on the synchronization loss of the nodes' internal clocks w.r.t. the global clock. By convention, we set ∆ = ∞ to denote the fully asynchronous setting. and δ = ∞, to denote that the adversary may drop messages. Any values δ, ∆ ∈ [0, ∞) refer to a semi-synchronous model, if δ, ∆ are known to the system's entities, or a partially synchronous model, if δ, ∆ are unknown.
Notation. We use κ as the security parameter and denote by N c , N w the number of IC and AB peers, respectively, and by n (an upper bound) on the number of users. In our security analysis, the parameters N c , N w , n are assumed polynomial in κ.
be the set of all involved BB system entities. We denote by t c (resp. t w ) the number of peers that the adversary may statically corrupt out of the N c (resp. N w ) total peers of the IC (resp. AB) subsystem. We denote the local record of IC peer P i at global time Clock = T as the set of accepted and confirmed items L post,i,T := x 1 , . . . ,
Similarly, the AB view of peer AB j at global time Clock = T is denoted as the set of items L pub,j,
(Confirmable) Persistence definition
We define Persistence via a security game G A,δ,∆,tc,tw Prst 1 κ , E between the challenger C and an adversary A. The game is also parameterized by the eventual message delivery and synchronization loss upper bounds δ and ∆. The adversary A may statically corrupt up to t c out-of the N c total IC peers and t w out-of the N w total AB peers, and may also choose to corrupt users. C initializes the BB system on behalf of the SA. Then, C and A engage in the Setup phase and the Posting and Publishing protocols, where C acts on behalf of the honest entities. The game is described in detail in Fig. 1 . Intuitively, the goal of A is to successfully attack the (bb.1) property (winning condition (P.1)) or the (bb.4) property (winning condition (P.2)).
Threat model for Persistence.
(P.I). The adversary A statically corrupts up to tc (resp. tw) out-of the Nc (resp. Nw) total peers of the IC (resp. AB) subsystem. Then, A provides C with the set Lcorr ⊂ E of corrupted parties. Throughout the game, C plays the role of honest entities that include SA. (P.II). When an honest entity X wants to transmit a message M to an honest entity Y , then it just sends (X, M, Y ) to A. If the honest entity X sends (X, M, Y ) to A, when the global time is Clock = T , then A must write M on the incoming network tape of Y by the time that Clock = T + δ (eventual message delivery). (P.III). A may write on the incoming network tape of any honest entity. (P.IV). A may invoke the event Inc(Clock[X]) under the restriction that for any X, |Clock[X] − Clock| ≤ ∆ (loose clock synchronization).
Protocol execution under the presence of A.
-The challenger initiates the Setup phase playing the role of SA and determines the posting policy P = Accept, Select(·) . Then, it initializes every system entity X ∈ E by running the event Init(X). Game winning conditions.
The game outputs 1 iff exists an AB peer ABj / ∈ Lcorr s.t. at least one of the following conditions holds: Game winning conditions.
The game outputs 1 iff for every k ∈ [Nw] and moment T , we have VerifyPub(L pub,k,T , params) = accept, and there is a (not necessarily honest) AB peer ABj s.t. at least one of the following conditions holds: (P.1). There is an item x, tc + 1 honest IC peers {Pi k } k∈[tc+1] , and moments T , T , such that (i) T ≤ T , (ii) x ∈ L pub,j,T , and (iii) x / ∈ L post,i k ,T , for any k ∈ [tc + 1]. (P.2). There is an item x, and moments T , T such that (i) T < T , (ii) x ∈ L pub,j,T , and (iii)
x / ∈ L pub,j,T . Subsequently, we extend the Persistence notion by defining Confirmable Persistence. Now, the entire AB may be malicious and deviate from the Publishing protocol, yet the adversary fails if its attack is detected via the VerifyPub algorithm, on the input view of any AB peer. Formally, Confirmable Persistence is defined via the game G A,δ,∆,tc C.Prst (1 κ , E) that follows the same steps as G A,δ,∆,tc,tw Prst (1 κ , E), for the special case t w = N w , except the following differences in the winning conditions for A, that are presented in detail in Fig. 2: (1) for every k ∈ [N w ], the published data on AB k should always verify successfully, and (2) the inconsistent AB j referred in either of (P.1) or (P.2) conditions may be any (malicious) AB peer.
We define Persistence and Confirmable Persistence as follows.
Definition 1 ((Confirmable) Persistence). Let κ be the security parameter, N c , N w , t c , t w ∈ N, δ, ∆ ∈ [0, +∞], and BB be a BB system with N c IC peers and N w AB peers. We say Threat model for Confirmable Liveness. The threat model satisfies conditions (P.I)-(P.IV) in Fig. 1 .
Protocol execution under the presence of A. The initialization by the challenger C and the engagement of A and C in the Setup phase, the Posting protocol, and the Publishing protocol is as in Fig. 1 .
Game winning conditions.
The game outputs 1 iff exists an honest user U , an item x and a moment T s.t. the following holds: that BB achieves Persistence for fault-tolerance thresholds (t c , t w ), delay message bound δ and synchronization loss bound ∆, if for every PPT adversary A it holds that
We say that BB achieves Confirmable Persistence for fault tolerance threshold t c , delay message bound δ and synchronization loss bound ∆, if for every PPT adversary A, it holds that
Confirmable θ-Liveness definition
We define θ-Confirmable Liveness via a security game G A,δ,∆,tc,tw θ−C.Live (1 κ , E) between the challenger C and an adversary A, where A statically corrupts up to t c (resp. t w ) out-of the N c (resp. N w ) total IC (resp. AB) peers, while C plays the role of SA and all peers and users that A does not corrupt. The adversary wins if it manages to prevent the generation of a valid receipt for an item x or the eventual publishing of x, given that x has been submitted at least θ time prior to the nearest Publishing protocol execution. The game is described in detail in Fig. 3 .
and let BB be a BB system with with N c IC peers and N w AB peers. We say that BB achieves Confirmable θ-Liveness for fault-tolerance thresholds (t c , t w ), delay message bound δ, and synchronization loss bound ∆, if for every PPT adversary A, it holds that
The Culnane-Schneider (CS) BB system
In this section, we provide an outline of CS BB system as presented in [20] adopted in our terminology, and analyze its security guarantees and weaknesses under the framework introduced in Sec. 4. The CS BB system comprises the setup authority SA, the users, the IC peers P 1 , . . . , P Nc and a single trusted AB (called WBB in [20] ), i.e., N w = 1. The fault-tolerance threshold on the number of corrupted IC peers, t c , that CS requires is
Description of the CS BB system
Setup. Upon specifying the posting policy P = Accept, Select(·) , the SA provides all entities with the description of an EUFCMA-secure signature scheme DS = (KGen, Sig, Vf) and a (t s , N c )-EUFCMA-secure TSS TSS = (DistKeygen, ShareSig, ShareVerify, TVf, Combine) (cf. Sec. 3). Then, each IC peer P i runs KGen(1 κ ) to obtain a signing key sk i and a verification key vk i , while all IC peers jointly execute DistKeygen(1 κ , t s , N c ) to produce a secret keys (tsk 1 , . . . , tsk Nc ), implicitly defining tsk, and the corresponding public output pk, (pk 1 , . . . , pk Nc ).
Upon key generation, the IC peers broadcast pk := {pk, (pk 1 , . . . , pk Nc ), (vk 1 , . . . , vk Nc )} to all other entities. The public parameters params include the description of DS, TSS, P, as well as pk. Finally, every user U engages with SA in an interaction to obtain her private input cr U . As mentioned in Sec. 4.1, cr U could be a singing key, or an authentication password.
From a timing aspect, the CS BB system runs in consecutive periods. Namely, each period p is a time interval [T begin,p , T end,p ] between two fixed global time values T begin,p and T end,p , and the end of a period matches the beginning of the next one. For each IC peer P i , we denote by B i,p the local record of P i including all items x recorded as posted and by D i,p the database of received items x together with other peers' signatures on them, for the period p. In the beginning of p,
Posting. If a user U wants to post item x during period p, then she broadcasts x to all IC peers, along with her credential cr U . Upon receiving and verifying the validity of (x, cr U ), each peer P i broadcasts a signature on (p, x, cr U ) under its singing key sk i . When P i receives N c − t c valid signatures on (p, x, cr U ) (including its own) from N c − t c different peers, it threshold signs (p, x) and sends it to U . Finally, when U receives N c − t c ≥ t s + 1 valid TSS shares from N c − t c different peers, it combines them to obtain a threshold signature on (p, x), as her receipt. We define VerifyRec(rec[x], x, cr U , params) := TVf pk ((p, x), TSign(tsk, (p, x))). The Posting protocol is presented in more detail in Fig. 6 of Appendix B.1.
Publishing. Given a period p = [T begin,p , T end,p ], all IC peers stop item recording and begin publishing their local records at a specified time T barrier,p ∈ (T begin,p , T end,p ). The Publishing protocol includes two subprotocols: initially, the IC peers run an Optimistic protocol that results in the publishing of a BB record, if at least N c − t c local BB records agree. We note that the Optimistic protocol always terminates successfully if all peers are honest. If the Optimistic protocol check fails, then IC peers engage in the Fallback protocol, where they exchange their databases of collected signatures for posted items. The Fallback protocol is essentially one round of the Floodset agreement algorithm [34, Section 6.2] with the following characteristic: if all users posted their items honestly, then Fallback need to run only once. Otherwise, as in standard Floodset, it needs to be executed up to N c − t c + 1 times in the synchronous setting.
When consensus is reached, the IC peers provide the AB with their records along with corresponding TSS shares. The AB sets the agreed record as its view for period p along with the reconstructed TSS signature from the collected shares. The total view of AB at some moment T , denoted by L pub,T , is the union of the agreed and published BB records for all periods preceding moment T . The Publishing protocol is presented in more detail in Fig. 7 of Appendix B.1.
Attacking the liveness of the CS BB system
As informally argued in [19, Sec. 8] (the full version of [20] ), the liveness in CS can be achieved if one of the following conditions hold: 1) all the peers are following the protocol honestly and are online, 2) a threshold of t c < N c /3 peers is malicious, but all users are honest, or 3) the more general condition that not all users are honest and the malicious peers may choose any database in their capability, but do not change their database once it has been fixed, and will not send different databases to different peers. The argument is that one can easily detect in practice if malicious peers send different databases to different peers.
In this section, we demonstrate an attack against the Confirmable Liveness of CS under our framework. Although our attack falls outside the threat model of [20] , it reveals that the presumed "fear of detection" that justifies the said threat model, and especially the more general condition 3) described above, is not rigorously addressed. In particular, we show that the liveness adversary may cleverly choose to split the honest peers into two groups, and yet not be detected by being consistent w.r.t. to the peers in the same group. This way, the adversary manages a liveness breach, while the honest IC peers cannot detect the attack relying on the protocol guidelines and their local views. As a result, our attack points out that the original description of CS must be enhanced with an explicit detection mechanism against any deviation from the IC consensus protocol specifications, in order for the threat model in [20] to be properly justified.
On the other hand, as we describe in Section 6 and prove in Section 7, enhancing CS with our novel Publishing protocol completely overcomes such issues, by achieving Confirmable Liveness even against a general Byzantine adversary.
Description of the liveness attack. Our attack works under fault tolerance threshold N c > 3t c , as required in [20] , and consists of seven steps described below. The steps are illustrated in Fig. 8 of Appendix B.2 for the simple case where N c = 4 and t c = 1:
Step 1: Let p be a period where the set of honestly posted items is non-empty. For simplicity, we assume that there is a single honest user U h who broadcasts x h to all IC peers P i , i ∈ [N c ], and obtains a valid receipt rec[x h ].
Step 2: A malicious user U c deviates from broadcasting and sends x c to all t c corrupted peers and N c − 2t c honest peers. Denote the latter set of honest N c − 2t c peers by H in . The malicious peers engage in the Posting protocol by interacting only with the peers in H in . Observe that even if t c honest peers do not participate in the post request of x c , the collaboration
Step 3: Another malicious userÛ c deviates from broadcasting and, like U c , sends itemx c to all t c corrupted peers and the N c − 2t c honest peers in H in . However, now the malicious peers do not engage in the Posting protocol, so the peers in H in do not suffice for a receipt forx c .
Step . Therefore, the malicious peers force all honest peers to engage in the Fallback protocol.
Step Step 7: After forcing the peers in H in to termination, the malicious peers become inert. This causes the peers in H out to remain pending for a new Fallback round that no other peer will follow. Moreover, the AB can not obtain N c − t c TSS shares on some agreed record, and thus it can not publish anything. This violates the property (bb.2) in [20] (expressed via condition (L.3) in Fig. 3 ), which dictates that since x h is an honestly posted item that has a receipt, it must be published to the AB. Thus, liveness is breached.
The strength of our liveness attack. The attack described above requires the collaboration of malicious users and corrupted IC peers. Nonetheless, it is important to note that during the Publishing protocol, the t c malicious peers behave consistently towards the N c − 2t c peers in H in by providing the same records and signature databases. In addition, the fact that they send no information to the peers in H out is a malicious behavior that the peers cannot prove to the peers in H in , i.e., the peers in H in cannot tell whether the peers in H out are (i) honest and they did not receive anything, or (ii) malicious and claim some false denial of service. As a result, the peers in H in can not distinguish whether (i) the t c malicious peers, or (ii) the t c peers in H out , are the ones that deviate from the protocol guidelines. This shows that the attacker can deviate from the guidelines and still not be detected, within the context of the CS IC consensus.
TSS Fault-Tolerance Requirements for Confirmable Persistence
In [20] no concrete recommendations are given for which TSS to use. For liveness to be achieved, TSS should be robust, i.e., malicious peers cannot block signature creation. Gennaro et al. show in [26] that TSS can achieve robustness only if t s < N c /2. This contradicts the CS requirements in Eq. (1) . Given that t s < N c /2, we can still prove the CS BB system to achieve Confirmable Persistence, but for a smaller bound of t c < N c /4. This bound is tight, in the sense that if t c ≥ N c /4, then there exists an attack. However, this issue seems to be less worrisome than the liveness attack in the previous section. Usually in TSS literature it is assumed that t s = t c . In [41] , Shoup proposes a more general definition of (k, t s , N c ) − TSS (with a construction) where t s is the number of malicious peers and k ≥ t s + 1 is the number of TSS shares needed to combine a valid signature. This would allow us to still get robustness by having t s < N c /2, but we can also set k = N c − t c , as CS requires in Eq. (1). Shoup's construction uses trusted setup, but if one prefers to avoid this, then they may use the trivial TSS defined in Sec. A.3.
In conclusion, CS BB could still achieve the bound t c < N c /3, but care must be taken when choosing TSS. Instantiating CS BB with an arbitrary TSS, might not give the expected security guarantees. More thorough treatment of this issue, together with the attack and the proof discussed above, is provided in Appendix B.3.
A New Publishing Protocol for the CS BB System
We present a new Publishing protocol that, when combined with the CS Posting protocol, results in a BB system that achieves Confirmable Liveness in partially synchronous model, and Persistence in asynchronous model, against a general Byzantine adversary, assuming a threshold of t c < N c /3 corrupted IC peers. Our novel Publishing protocol requires (i) eventual message delivery and (ii) the existence of a Binary Consensus (BC) protocol BC with t c < N c /3 Byzantine fault tolerance. Both these conditions are met in the partially synchronous model (cf. [22] ). Recall that a BC protocol satisfies: 1) Termination: all honest peers will decide on some value, 2) Agreement: all honest peers decide on the same value, and 3) Validity: if all honest peers engage in the protocol with input b ∈ {0, 1}, then they all decide on b.
The protocol consists of the following phases:
The Initialization phase: each IC peer P i initializes the following vectors: (i). Its direct view of local records, denoted by View i,p := B i,1,p , . . . ,B i,Nc,p : by setting B i,j,p ← ⊥, for j = i, andB i,i,p ← B i,p .
(ii). For every j ∈ [N c ] \ {i}, its indirect view of local records as provided by P j , denoted by View i,j,p := B i j,1,p , . . . ,B i j,Nc,p : by setting View i,j,p ← ⊥, . . . , ⊥ . (iii). A variable vector b i,1 , . . . , b i,Nc , where b i,j is a value in {?, 0, 1} and expresses the opinion of P i on the validity of P j 's behavior. Initially, only b i,i is fixed to 1, while for j = i, b i,j is set to the "pending" value '?'. When P i fixes b i,j to some value 1/0 for all j ∈ [N c ] (which we prove it happens, cf. Lemma 3), it engages in the Consensus phase, that we describe shortly.
(iv). An integer variable vector d i,1 , . . . , d i,Nc , where d i,j denotes the number of P i 's (direct or indirect) views that agree regarding P j 's record. Initially, d i,j = 0, for j = i, and d i,i = 1.
The Collection phase: upon initialization, P i signs its local record B i,p , followed by a tag denoted by record, and broadcasts (record, B i,p ), Sig sk i (record, B i,p ) to all IC peers. During this phase, P i updates its direct and indirect views of other IC peers' records and fixes its opinion bit for their behavior, depending on the number of consistent signed messages it receives on each peer's record. In particular, -When P i receives a message (record, R i,j,p ), Sig sk j (record, R i,j,p ) signed by peer P j that was never received before, then it acts as follows: if R i,j,p is formatted as a non-⊥ record and the "opinion" bit b i,j is not fixed (i.e. b i,j = '?'), then it verifies the validity of the message by checking if Vf pk j (record, R i,j,p ), Sig sk j (record, R i,j,p ) = 1. If the latter holds, then P i operates according to either of the following two cases:
1. IfB i,j,p = ⊥, then it marks P j as malicious, that is, it setsB i,j,p ← ⊥ and fixes b i,j to 0. Observe that since P j is authenticated (except from some negl(κ) error), it is safe for P i to mark P j as malicious, as an honest peer would never send two different versions of its local records.
2. IfB i,j,p = ⊥, then P i updates View i,p asB i,j,p ← R i,j,p , and View i,j,p asB i j,j,p ← R i,j,p and increases the d i,j by 1. Next, it signs and re-broadcasts to all IC peers the received message in the
Upon fixing b i,j to 1/0, P i ignores any message for the record of P j .
-When P i receives a message V k,j , Sig sk k (V k,j ) signed by peer P k for some peer P j different than P i and P k , where V k,j = (view, j), ((record, R k,j,p ), Sig sk j (record, R k,j,p )) , and the message was never received before, then it acts as follows: if R k,j,p is formatted as a non-⊥ record and b i,j = '?', then it executes verification Vf pk k (V k,j , Sig sk k (V k,j )). If Vf pk k (V k,j , Sig sk k (V k,j )) = 1, then P i operates according to either of the following two cases:
1. If Vf pk j (record, R i,j,p ), Sig sk j (record, R i,j,p ) = 0 orB i k,j,p = ⊥, then P i setsB i,k,p ← ⊥, fixes the bit b i,k to 0 and engages in the Consensus phase for the record of P k (marked as malicious). Observe that it is safe for P i to mark P k as a malicious, since an honest P k would neither send two non-⊥ views for P j , nor accept an invalid signature from P j in the first place.
2. If Vf pk j (record, R i,j,p ), Sig sk j (record, R i,j,p ) = 1 andB i k,j,p = ⊥, then P i updates View i,k,p by settingB i k,j,p ← R k,j,p . Then, P i updates View i,j,p according to the cases below:
(C.1). If for every k ∈ [Nc] \ {i} such thatB i k ,j,p = ⊥, it holds thatB i k ,j,p =B i k,j,p :=B i j,p (i.e. all non-⊥ records for j agree on some recordB i j,p ), then it increases the value of di,j by 1. Moreover, if di,j = tc + 1, (i.e., there are tc + 1 matching non-⊥ records) andBi,j,p = ⊥, then it updates asBi,j,p ←B i j,p and fixes the bit bi,j to 1.
(C.2). If there is a k ∈ [Nc] such thatB i k ,j,p = ⊥ andB i k,j,p =B i k ,j,p , then it updates asBi,j,p ← ⊥ and fixes the bit bi,j to 0.
In either case, upon fixing b i,j ,P i ignores any message for the record of P j 6 .
-When P i has fixed N c −t c opinion bits, it broadcasts a request message (request view, j), Sig sk i (request view, j) , for every P j that it has not yet fixed the opinion bit b i,j . This step is executed to ensure that P i will eventually fix its opinion bits for all IC peers. Upon receiving P i 's request, P k replies with a signature for a response message W k,j , Sig sk k (W k,j ) , where W k,j := (response view, j), ((record, R k,j,p ), Sig sk j (record, R k,j,p )) . Note that here R k,j,p may be ⊥, reflecting the lack of direct view of P k for P j 's record until it received P i 's request.
For every P j that P i has broadcast a request (request view, j), Sig sk i (request view, j) , P i waits until it collects N c − t c − 1 distinct signed responses that verify successfully. During this wait, it ignores any message in a format other than W k,j , Sig sk k (W k,j ) or (request view, j), Sig sk k (request view, j) . When N c − t c − 1 distinct valid responses are received, it parses the collection of the N c − t c − 1 responses and its current direct view of P j 's recordB i,j,p and fixes b i,j as follows: (a) ifB i,j,p = ⊥, all responses for non-⊥ records are at least t c and matchB i,j,p , then P i fixes b i,j to 1; (b) ifB i,j,p = ⊥, all responses for non-⊥ records are at least t c + 1 and refer to the same record denoted asB i j,p , then P i setsB i,j,p ←B i j,p and fixes b i,j to 1; (c) else, it setsB i,j,p ← ⊥ and fixes b i,j to 0 7 .
In any case, upon fixing b i,j , P i ignores any message for the record of P j . Whenever P i fixes b i,j to some value 1/0, the view of P i for P j 's record reaches a "binary" state (cf. Lemma 3), i.e., P i 's opinion on P j 's record is that it is either (i) a fixed non-⊥ record, or (ii) set to ⊥. Thus, honest peers can reach consensus for all records, as described below.
The Consensus phase: when P i fixes its "opinion" b i,j to some value 1/0 for P j for every j ∈ [N c ], it engages in the partially synchronous Binary Consensus (BC) protocol BC, for the question "Is my view of P j 's record set to a non-⊥ value? ". Namely, each peer P i engages in BC with input b i,j = 1, ifB i,j,p ←B i j,p = ⊥ and b i,j = 0, ifB i,j,p ← ⊥, as set at the Collection phase. The BC properties guarantee termination and agreement, i.e. all honest peers agree on the same value. Moreover, during Collection phase, all N c − t c ≥ t c honest peers have received each others' (fixed) records, so they engage in BC for an honest peer P j on input 1. Hence, by the validity property of BC, the honest peers will agree on 1 for P j . After all N c BC executions have terminated (the IC peers have decided), for every j ∈ [N c ] \ {i}, P i updates its view as follows: IfB i,j,p = ⊥, but P i decided 0 for P j , then it updates asB i,j,p ← ⊥.
The peer P i considers the Consensus phase finished, only when it has completed the BC protocols for all peers' records. Then, they proceed to the Finalization phase described below.
The Finalization phase: having updated its direct view View i,p := B i,1,p , . . . ,B i,Nc,p for every pair (p, x) ∈ j:B i,j,p =⊥B i,j,p , peer P i defines the set N i,p (x) that denotes the number of IC peers that, according to P i 's view, have included (p, x) in their records. Formally, we write In any other case, B i,p becomes unchanged 8 . As shown in Lemma 3, at the end of the Finalization phase, all honest peers have included all honestly posted items for which a receipt has been generated in their local records. Then, they proceed to the Publication phase described below.
The Publication phase: each peer P i threshold signs its record B i,p , as it has been updated during the Finalization phase, by threshold signing each item in B i,p individually. Formally, we write ShareSig(tsk i , (p, B i,p )) := (p,x)∈B i,p ShareSig(tsk i , (p, x)). Then, it sends to AB the message (p, B i,p ), ShareSig(tsk i , (p, B i,p )) .
In turn, the AB receives and records threshold signature shares for posted items. For every item (p, x) that AB receives N c − t c distinct successfully verified signatures shares (j, σ j ) j∈S , where S is a subset of ≥ N c −t c IC peers, it adds (p, x) to the record B p (initialized as empty) and computes a TSS signature on (p, x) as TSign(tsk, (p, x)) ← Combine pk, pk 1 , . . . , pk Nc , (p, x), (j, σ j ) j∈S .
At the end of period p, AB fixes the signed record TSign(tsk, (p, B p )) := (p,x)∈Bp TSign(tsk, (p, x)) and publishes the record 
Properties of the New BB System
In this section, we prove the properties of the BB system described in Sec. 6. We write T B to denote the running time of algorithm B, omitting parameterization by the security parameter κ for brevity. The parameters N c , t c are considered polynomial in κ. Recall that since we have only one AB peer, we denote the view of the AB as L pub,T = L pub,1,T .
In our setting, we assume that, given the running time of the protocol steps, the message delivery delay δ and the synchronization loss bound ∆ are small enough with respect to the intervals [T begin,p , T barrier,p ], [T barrier,p , T end,p ] that specify phase length and changing in each period p. We stress that this restriction does not violate partial synchronicity, as δ, ∆ need not to be known to the IC peers for executing the protocol.
Persistence. The Persistence of the new BB system holds in the asynchronous model, preserving the security of the BB protocols per period under sequential composition due to period advancement. This holds because the view of the AB in some moment T at period p, is the union of the views of all periods preceding p which is invariant to the publishing order of each view. The proof of the following theorem is given in Appendix C.1.
Let TSS be a (t s , N c )-EUFCMA-secure TSS. Then, the BB system described in Sec. 6 with N c IC peers over TSS achieves Persistence for tolerance thresholds (t c , 0).
Remark 1 (From Persistence to Confirmable Peristence). The new BB system does not support
Confirmable Persistence because although a malicious AB could not attack condition (P.1) of Fig. 2 (this part of the proof of Theorem 1 is valid even against a malicious AB), it could breach condition (P.2) by discarding all signature shares on items published at earlier periods. A way to address this problem with a simple modification would be to replace a single AB with a subsystem of N w AB peers. Then, the IC peers would broadcast their local records to all peers at the Publication phase and the AB peers would proceed as the centralized AB described in Section 6. In addition, reading of the AB data would be via honest majority (i.e. t w < N w /2) of matching data on the AB peers, as in [16] . This way, any alteration of previous published data by some AB peer would be detected by an auditor, while the fact that the majority of the AB peers would be consistent, would also hold this peer accountable. Thus, a minority of malicious AB peers could not attack (P.2) -and still not (P.1) of course -so Confirmable Persistence would be achievable. Le DS = (KGen, Sig, Vf) be a signature scheme. We provide the definition of EUFCMA security game G A DS (1 κ ) in Fig. 4 .
The EUFCMA security game G A DS (1 κ ).
1. The challenger C DS runs KGen to generate a keypair (pk, sk). The adversary A receives pk as input.
2. The adversary may ask the C DS to sign a number of messages. To query the i-th signature, A submits a message mi to C DS , which returns σi ← Sig(sk, m).
3.
A outputs a message m * and a signature σ * .
The game outputs 1 (A wins) iff (i) Vf(pk, m * , σ * ) = 1, and (ii) for every i, it holds that (m * , σ * ) = (mi, σi). Definition 3 (Security signature schemes). Let DS = (KGen, Sig, Vf) be a signature scheme. We say that DS is EUFCMA-secure if for every PPT adversary A, it holds that
A.2 (t s , N )-EUFCMA security of threshold signature schemes
Let TSS = (DistKeygen, ShareSig, ShareVerify, TVf, Combine) be a threshold signature scheme. We provide the definition of (t s , N )-EUFCMA security game G A TSS (1 κ , t s , N ) in Fig. 5 .
Definition 4 (Security of threshold signature schemes). Let t s , N be values polynomial in the security parameter κ. Let TSS = (DistKeygen, ShareSig, ShareVerify, TVf, Combine) be a threshold signature scheme. We say that TSS is (t s , N )-EUFCMA-secure if for every PPT adversary A, it holds that Pr[G A TSS (1 κ , t s , N ) = 1] = negl(κ) . We define A's advantage Adv tss A (κ, t s , N ) as the probability that A wins the game G A TSS (1 κ , t s , N ), taken over all coin tosses, i.e.
Adv tss
The (ts, N )-EUFCMA security game G A TSS (1 κ , ts, N ).
1. First, A decides on the set Lcorr ⊂ {1, . . . , N } of corrupted players, and sends it to the challenger C TSS .
A is allowed to act on behalf of each Pi ∈ Lcorr. Then DistKeygen(1 κ , ts, N ) is executed. During this, C TSS plays the role of all honest players Pi. At the end of this step, A gets access to pk. 2. A can make up to polynomial number of signing queries as follows: for i ∈ {1, . . . , N } \ Lcorr, A submits pair (i, m) to C TSS . Then, C TSS returns σi ← ShareSig(tski, m) to A.
3.
A outputs a message m * and a signature σ * . Let V = Lcorr ∪ S, where S is the subset of players for which A made a signing query (i, m * ).
The game outputs 1 (A wins) iff (i) TVf(pk, m * , σ * ) = 1, and (ii) |V| ≤ ts. 
A.3 Trivial TSS
In our work, we refer to the following trivial (t s , N )-TSS, where t s < N can be any non-negative integer: given an EUFCMA-secure signature scheme DS, each party P i has an independently generated public and secret key. The signature share of P i on m is equal to her signature on m and signature shares are combined by concatenation. The TSS verification on (σ 1 , . . . , σ t ) succeeds only if each individual signature verification succeeds and t > t s . Clearly, trivial TSS is (t s , N )-EUFCMA-secure. We note that the trivial TSS slightly deviates from the previous definition of TSS, as there is no secret key tsk shared between the parties.
B Appendix of Section 5 B.1 The Posting and Publishing protocols of the CS BB system
We provide detailed descriptions of the Posting and Publishing protocols of the CS BB system in Fig. 6 and Fig. 7, respectively. 
B.2 Illustrating the attack against the liveness of the CS BB system
We illustrate the steps of our liveness attack in Fig. 8 for the case where N c = 4 and t c = 1.
The Optimistic Protocol.
Pi → Pj: Each Pi broadcasts (p, Bi,p), Sig sk i (p, Bi,p) to all Pj.
-Each Pi waits until it receives Nc −tc valid signatures (p, Bj,p), ρj := Sig sk j (p, Bj,p) from different IC peers (including its own). Let I be the set of those peers.
-If Pj ∈ I : Bj,p = Bi,p ∧ Vf pk j (ρj) = 1 < Nc − tc, then Pi broadcasts a message (p, Di,p), Sig sk i (p, Di,p) to all IC peers, indicating that it engages in the Fallback protocol (see below). Pi → AB: Each Pi sends (p, Bi,p), ShareSig tsk i (p, Bi,p) to AB. AB: Waits for messages (p, Bj,p), σj = ShareSig tsk j (p, Bj,p) from at least Nc − tc ≥ ts + 1 peers Pj.
-Let S be a set of those ≥ Nc −tc peers that agree on the contents of the BB and let Bp be the board of agreed-on contents. Compute TSign tsk (p, Bp) ← Combine pk, pk 1 , . . . , pk Nc , (p, Bp), (j, σj)j∈S . 
B.3 Confirmable Persistence of CS BB
In the Posting protocol of the CS BB system, if the centralized AB is honest, then it will neither accept inconsistently signed data nor remove any existing published items. As a result, CS satisfies the properties (bb.1) and (bb.4), which are captured in our Persistence definition. As for Confirmable Persistence, all data published by the AB must be signed by a TSS signature. Thus, even if AB is malicious, then, clearly, any attack that includes illegitimate item posting or published item removal will be detected as long as the t s out-of N c TSS fault tolerance threshold is preserved, since the malicious AB can not forge signatures on inconsistent records without the consent of at least a number of honest peers. This raises the following conflict: TSS fault tolerance must satisfy the restrictions in equation Eq. (1), namely that t s + 1 > 2N c /3, however, the robustness requirement t s < N c /2 stated in [26] must also hold, otherwise liveness is trivially breached. These two requirements are clearly contradictory.
Since the robustness is necessary, we study the security of CS in the case of t s < N c /2. The following paragraph argues that for t s < N c /2 and t c ≥ N c /4, there is an attack against confirmable persistence. Specifically, the attack achieves winning condition (P.1) in Fig. 2 (property  (bb.1) ). Subsequently, we show that for t c < N c /4 CS does achieve confirmable persistence.
Description of the Confirmable Persistence attack. Assume that N c ≥ 4, N c /4 ≤ t c < N c /3 and a (t s , N c )-EUFCMA-secure TSS, where t c ≤ t s < N c /2. Our attack consists of the three steps described below and illustrated in Fig. 9 , for the case of N c = 10, t c = 3 and t s = 4:
Step 1: Let t h = t s − t c . Assume that in period p a user U posts an item (p, x) but does not obtain a receipt. More precisely, assume that the adversary blocked the communication so that at the end of the posting protocol, (p, x) ∈ B i,p for only one honest peer P i .
Step 2: During the Optimistic protocol, the adversary blocks messages so that all t c = t s − t h corrupted peers and exactly (t s + 1) − t c = t h + 1 honest peers (thus, in total t s + 1 peers) threshold sign a record B p such that (p, x) ∈ B p and send it to the AB. More precisely, only
Step 1. Step 6. the said t s + 1 peers will obtain N c − t c signatures on B p . Thus, a malicious AB can construct a receipt on B p .
P4
Step 3: The remaining N c − t c − (t h + 1) honest peers together with t c corrupted peers execute the Fallback and the Optimistic protocol, and agree on a B p s.t. (x, p) ∈ B p . Since N c ≥ 4 and N c /4 ≤ t c ≤ t s < N c /2, we have that
Thus, a malicious AB can construct a receipt on B p . By the above, a malicious AB can output two valid threshold signatures for a period p, i.e., The extent of the Confirmable Persistence attack. We show that even with t s < N c /2, CS BB can still tolerate a threshold of t c < N c /4 malicious peers. More generally, if we forget about the robustness bound (which is only for liveness), then CS BB has Confirmable Persistence for t c < (t s + 1)/2.
To prove this claim, we make use of Lemma 1 showing that if an adversary A wins the Confirmable Persistence game G A,δ,∆,tc C.Prst (1 κ , E), then for every period p, at least t h + 1 honest peers have contributed their signature share for the TSS of the published record for p.
P1
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Step 1. During the Posting protocol, P10 is the only honest peer that received the post request for x. The honest peers P1, . . . , P6 colored in gray are unaware of x.
Step 2. During the Optimistic protocol only the ts + 1 = 5 peers P1, P4, P7, P8, P9 obtain Nc − tc = 7 signatures and send their TSS shares for Bi,p (x, p) to the malicious AB.
Step 3. The Nc − tc + 1 = 8 peers P2, P3, P5, . . . , P10 start Fallback and Optimistic protocols, and after that send their TSS shares on B ip (x, p) to the malicious AB. Lemma 1. Let N c , t c , t c , t s ∈ N such that t c ≤ t s , t c ≤ t c , and let δ = ∆ = ∞. Let TSS = (DistKeygen, ShareSig, ShareVerify, TVf, Combine) be a (t s , N c )-EUFCMA-secure TSS. Let A be an arbitrary PPT adversary that corrupts t c IC peers and t h := t s − t c . If G A,δ,∆,tc C.Prst (1 κ , E) = 1 for the CS BB system then for any period p, with probability 1 − negl(κ) there is a set H := {P i k } k∈[t h +1] of honest IC peers that output ((p, B p ), ShareSig(tsk i k , (p, B p ))) for k ∈ [t h + 1], where B p is the published record for p.
Proof. Let T > T end,p be a moment after the end of period p. If G A,δ,∆,tc C.Prst (1 κ , E) = 1 then VerifyPub L pub,T = accept, therefore ABreceipt[p, B p ] = ((p, B p ), σ = TSign(tsk, (p, B p ))) ∈ L pub,T such that TVf(pk, (p, B p ), σ) = 1. Let H = {P i k } be the set of honest IC peers that output ShareSig(tsk i k , (p, B p ) ).
Suppose to the contrary that less than t h + 1 honest peers output a threshold signature on (p, B p ). We construct the following adversary A TSS that breaks the static (t s , N c )-EUFCMA security of TSS by emulating the game G A,δ,∆,tc C.Prst (1 κ , E) playing the role of the challenger. The security reduction is executed as shown below:
1. After A responds with the set of corrupted IC peers L corr , A TSS in turn sends L corr to the challenger C TSS of the (t s , N c )-EUFCMA security game and hence corrupts the same subset of peers. 2. A TSS engages in the Setup phase with A playing the role of SA and the honest IC peers as follows: (a) A TSS specifies the posting policy P = Accept, Select(·) and a signature scheme DS = (KGen, Sig, Vf). It sends the description of P, DS and TSS to A.
(b) A TSS engages with A in the joint execution of DistKeygen(1 κ , t s , N c ) by the IC peers, by forwarding the messages of A during the interaction of itself and C in the joint execution at the beginning of the (t s , N c )-EUFCMA security game. At the end of the joint execution, both A TSS and A obtain the TSS public key pk. (c) On behalf of each honest peer P i , A TSS runs KGen(1 κ ) to obtain a signing key sk i and a verification key vk i . It sends the generated verification keys to A which provides A TSS with the malicious peers' verification keys (if this does not happen, then A TSS aborts). Since t c ≤ t s , if A wins G A,δ,∆,tc C.Prst (1 κ , E), then it has corrupted no more than t s IC peers. In addition, A makes no singing queries for (p, B p ) during its engagement with the BB protocols, which means that, by assumption, A obtains less than t h + 1 additional threshold signatures, i.e. the ones provided by the honest peers. In total, A obtains no more than t c + t h ≤ t s threshold signatures, so the restrictions of the (t s , N c )-EUFCMA security game (cf. Fig. 5 ) are preserved. Therefore, TVf(pk, (p, B p ), σ) = 1 implies that ((p, B p ), σ) is a successful forgery against the static (t s , N c )-EUFCMA security of TSS. Thus, if A wins G A,δ,∆,tc C.Prst (1 κ , E) with nonnegligible probability α, then A TSS outputs a successful forgery with the same probability α, which contradicts to the (t s , N c )-EUFCMA-security of TSS. We conclude that, with probability 1−negl(κ), there exists a set H of t h +1 honest peers that output ((p, B p ), σ) for k ∈ [t h +1].
Given Lemma 1, we can prove the following theorem. Proof. Let A be an any PPT adversary against the Confirmable Persistence game G A,δ,∆,tc C.Prst (1 κ , E) that corrupts t c ≤ t c IC peers. As before t h := t s − t c . Note that condition t s ≥ t c of Lem. 1 is satisfied since 2t c < t s + 1. We show that with probability 1 − negl(κ) neither of the properties (P.1) nor (P.2) can hold if VerifyPub(L pub,j,T , params) = accept for every moment T .
There is a moment T such that if VerifyPub L pub,T , params = accept, then (P.1) cannot hold: Suppose to the contrary that there exists an item (p, x), honest peers H = {P i k } k∈[tc+1] , and moments T , T , such that (i) T ≤ T , (ii) (x, p) ∈ L pub,T , and (iii) (x, p) / ∈ L post,i k ,T , for any k ∈ [t c + 1]. Since VerifyPub L pub,T = accept and TSS is (t s , N c )-unforgeable, it follows from Lem. 1 that for some period p at least t h + 1 honest peers signed B p such that (p, x) ∈ B p no later than T . Recall that an honest peer threshold signs B p if it has obtained N c − t c signatures on (p, B p ).
First, we look at the case where less than N c − t c − t c of the signatures are created by honest peers. We show that this allows us to construct an efficient adversary A s that breaks EUFCMA security of DS. Let C DS be the challenger of EUFCMA game (cf. Fig. 3 ). The construction of A s is as follows.
1. Challenger C DS generates a keypair (pk, sk) and sends pk to A s . 2. Adversary A s runs A that returns L corr and in particular the set of corrupted IC peers IC where |IC| = t c . 3. A s assigns the key pk to a random honest peer P i ∈ IC and sets S ← ∅. 4. A s runs Setup phase as usual and interacts with A exactly as the challenger of the Confirmable Persistence game would (in particular, it interacts for the honest entities), only with the following exceptions: (a) If A s needs to sign a message under pk, then it asks it from C DS (A s itself does not know sk). (b) Whenever an honest peer receives a valid signature ρ of a message (p, B p ) under a public key pk of some IC peer, it adds ρ to S if S has no signatures under pk before. 5. Finally, if P i 's signature σ is in S and P i is the honest peer that did not sign (p, B p ), then A s returns σ as a forgery. We know that |S| ≥ N c − t c and hence at least N c − t c − t c of the signatures in S are valid signatures of distinct honest peers. We assumed that less than N c − t c − t c of honest peers output a signature on (p, B p ), therefore A has forged a signature of at least one honest peer. Since public keys of all honest peers come from the same distribution and A s assigned pk to a random honest peer, then at least with the probability 1 Nc−t c , A forged a signature for pk. Therefore A s wins the EUFCMA game with a non-negligible probability in κ.
In the second case, we assume that at least N c − t c − t c of the signatures are from honest peers. For these peers (p, x) ∈ B i,p . However, the honest peers only sign one local record so these N c −t c −t c peers are all different from the t c +1 honest peers that have not included x in their list of posted items at moment T ≥ T hence, later than p.
we have a contradiction with condition (ii).
There is a moment T such that if VerifyPub L pub,T , params = accept, then (P.2) cannot hold: First, let us show that for a single period p with probability 1 − negl(κ), adversary A can output a valid threshold signature for only one database.
Assume to the contrary that A outputs for B p = B p , such that Vf pk ((p, B p ), σ) = Vf pk ((p, B p ), σ ) = 1. From Lem. 1, we get that the set H of t h + 1 honest peers threshold-signed (p, B p ) and the set H of t h + 1 honest peers threshold-signed (p, B p ). According to the protocol description, H ∩ H = ∅.
An honest peer threshold-signs B p if it has obtained N c − t c signatures on (p, B p ). Suppose now that less than N c − t c − t c of the signatures are from honest peers. In that case we can construct an adversary A s that breaks unforgeability of Σ, the construction of A s is the same as above.
Therefore, at least N c − t c − t c of the signatures are from honest peers, denoted by the set S. Since t h + 1 > t c , it holds that
so at least one honest peer P i threshold signs B p and sends signature on B p . If P i first thresholdsigns B p , then the protocol is over for P i , and it would not sign B p . So, it must first sign B p and then threshold sign the database B p , which implies B p ⊆ B p .
Arguing similarly, we get that there must me be some honest peer P j that first signed B p and later threshold signed B p , which implies that B p ⊆ B p . Therefore, B p = B p which contradicts our assumption. Now we show that (P.2) can not hold. We have that L pub,T = p∈Prec[p ] ABreceipt[p, Bp] , where p is the period number at moment T , and VerifyPub L pub,T = accept. Suppose there exists a moment T ≥ T and an item (p, x) such that (p, x) ∈ L pub,T and (p, x) / ∈ L pub,T . As (p, x) ∈ L pub,T , it follows that there exists p ≤ p such that (p, x) ∈ B p . On the contrary, as (p, x) / ∈ L pub,T and T is later than p, we have that there is another published recordB p s.t. (p, x) ∈B p . Since for every period p adversary can output a valid signature for exactly one record, we have a contradiction.
Discussion. Theorem 3 implies that 1). If t s < N c /2 (robustness bound), then we can show the bound t c < N c /4 + 1/2. Together with the attack in beginning of this Section, we get that t c < N c /4 and this bound is tight.
2). If t s = 2N c /3 (original CS bound), then t c < N c /3 which is exactly the bound that Culnane and Schneider claim. Moreover, the attack described in the beginning of this Section depends on the bound t s < N c /2. We argue that there are simple (but perhaps not ideal) ways to bypass t s < N c /2 bound and hence possible to avoid Confirmable Persistence attack. However, it can be seen as a warning that a TSS scheme can not be utilized as a black-box tool in order to realize CS BB system.
Reason for the robustness bound t c < N c /2, is that typically TSS is studied in the case when t c = t s . Hence, if t s ≥ N c /2, then signing is only possible with the help from malicious peers and robustness cannot be achieved because they can block the signature creation.
In [41] Shoup proposes a more general (k, t s , N c ) − TSS construction where t s is the number of malicious peers and k ≥ t s + 1 is the number of signature shares needed to combine a valid signature. This scheme also assumes that t s < N c /2 but k can be larger than t s + 1. Such definition seems to be more appropriate for the CS BB setting since we may take k = 2N c /3 + 1, t s = N c /3 − 1 and still maintain robustness. Besides [41] , we are aware of only [1] that proposes a (k, t s , N c ) − TSS. Both schemes however use a trusted dealer which preferably should be avoided in the e-voting scenario.
Another possibility is to use the trivial (k, t s , N c )-TSS scheme described in Sec. A.3. Trivial scheme has robustness for any t s such that t s ≤ N c − t s − 1, since key generation is done locally and there are enough honest peers to produce a valid signature. Of course, this TSS construction loses the main advantage of TSS, which is to achieve lower communication and verification complexity than sending and verifying N c signatures individually.
We do not claim that it is impossible to construct a (k, t s , N c )-TSS which would avoid the issues mentioned above. However, care must be taken when instantiating CS BB, since most TSS schemes in the literature are not proved secure as (k, t, N c ) − TSS. Setting the parameter t s greater than N c /2 in case of (t s , N c ) − TSS might not be secure even if t c < N c /2.
C Appendix for Section 7

C.1 Proof of Theorem 1
First, we prove the following Lemma stating that if an adversary A wins the Confirmable Persistence game G A,δ,∆,tc C.Prst (1 κ , E), then for every period p and (p, x) ∈ B p that is published by the AB, at least t h + 1 honest peers have contributed their TSS signature share for (p, x). Note that since it holds for Confirmable Persistence game it also holds for the Persistence game G A,δ,∆,tc,tw
Let N c , t c , t c , t s ∈ N such that t c ≤ t s , t c ≤ t c , and let δ = ∆ = ∞. Let TSS = (DistKeygen, ShareSig, ShareVerify, TVf, Combine) be a (t s , N c )-EUFCMA-secure TSS. Let A be an arbitrary PPT adversary that corrupts t c IC peers and t h := t s − t c . If G A,δ,∆,tc C.Prst (1 κ , E) = 1 for the BB system described in Sec. 6, then for any period p, T > T end,p and (p, x) ∈ L pub,T , with probability 1 − negl(κ) there is a set H := {P i k } k∈[t h +1] of honest IC peers that provide AB with ShareSig(tsk i k , (p, x)) for k ∈ [t h + 1].
Proof. Let T > T end,p be a moment after the end of period p. If G A,δ,∆,tc C.Prst (1 κ , E) = 1 then VerifyPub L pub,T = accept, therefore ABreceipt[p, B p ] = ((p, B p ), σ = TSign(tsk, (p, B p ))) ∈ L pub,T such that (p,x )∈Bp TVf pk, p, x ), TSign(tsk, (p, x ) = accept. Let H = {P i k } be the set of honest IC peers that output ShareSig(tsk i k , (p, x)), where (p, x) ∈ B p .
Suppose to the contrary that less than t h + 1 honest peers output a threshold signature on (p, x). We construct the following adversary A TSS that breaks the static (t s , N c )-EUFCMA security of TSS by emulating the game G A,δ,∆,tc C.Prst (1 κ , E) playing the role of the challenger. The security reduction is executed as shown below:
1. After A responds with the set of corrupted IC peers L corr , A TSS in turn sends L corr to the challenger C TSS of the (t s , N c )-EUFCMA security game and hence corrupts the same subset of peers. Since t c ≤ t s , if A wins G A,δ,∆,tc C.Prst (1 κ , E), then it has corrupted no more than t s IC peers. In addition, A makes no singing queries for (p, x) ∈ B p during its engagement with the BB protocols, which means that, by assumption, A obtains less than t h + 1 additional threshold signatures, i.e. the ones provided by the honest peers. In total, A obtains no more than t c + t h ≤ t s threshold signatures, so the restrictions of the (t s , N c )-EUFCMA security game (cf. Fig. 5 ) are preserved. Therefore, TVf pk, p, x), TSign(tsk, (p, x) = 1 implies that ((p, x), σ) is a successful forgery against the static (t s , N c )-EUFCMA security of TSS. Thus, if A wins G A,δ,∆,tc C.Prst (1 κ , E) with non-negligible probability α, then A TSS outputs a successful forgery with the same probability α, which contradicts to the (t s , N c )-EUFCMA-security of TSS. We conclude that, with probability 1 − negl(κ), there exists a set H of t h + 1 honest peers that provide AB with ShareSig(tsk i k , (p, x)) Then, we apply Lemma 2 to prove Theorem 1 below:
Proof. Let A be an arbitrary PPT adversary against Persistence game G A,δ,∆,tc,tw Prst 1 κ , E that corrupts t c ≤ t c IC peers. We set t h := t s − t c . Note that the condition t c ≤ t s of Lemma 2 is satisfied since t s ≥ N c − t c − 1 > 2t c − 1 and therefore t s ≥ 2t c ≥ t c . We show that, with probability 1 − negl(κ), neither (P.1) nor (P.2) from Fig. 1 hold. (P.1) cannot hold: Note that since AB is honest, then VerifyPub(L pub,T , params) = accept for every moment T . Suppose to the contrary that there exists an item (p, x), honest peers
, and moments T , T , such that (i) T ≤ T , (ii) (p, x) ∈ L pub,T , and (iii) (p, x) / ∈ L post,i k ,T , for any k ∈ [t c + 1]. As VerifyPub L pub,T = accept and TSS is (t s , N )-EUFCMA-secure, it follows from Lemma 2 that with probability 1 − negl(κ) there are at least t h + 1 honest peers that provide AB with ShareSig(tsk i k , (p, x)) no later than moment T . By condition (ii) above, we have that (t h + 1) + (t c + 1) ≥ t s + 2 > N c − t c , so there exists an honest peer that threshold signed an item (p, x) that's not in its database. According to protocol description, an honest peer never does it. Hence, we have a contradiction.
(P.2) cannot hold: This is trivially true for our protocol. Clearly, for all moments T < T and all (p, x) ∈ L pub,j,T , we have (p, x) ∈ L pub,j,T since honest AB never removes items.
C.2 Proof of Theorem 2
IC Consensus in the Publishing protocol. As a first step, we prove that all honest peers will include all honestly posted items for which a valid receipt has been generated. Lemma 3. Let N c , t c ∈ N such that t c < N c /3 and δ, ∆ ∈ R ≥0 . Let DS be an EUFCMA-secure signature scheme and BC be a Binary Consensus (BC) protocol with t c -out-of-N c fault tolerance, that is partially synchronous for message delivery delay bound δ and synchronization loss bound ∆. Let (p, x) be an honestly posted item for which the user has obtained a valid receipt. Then, every honest IC peer P i engaging at the Publishing protocol over DS and BC, will include (p, x) in B i,p at the end of the Finalization phase, with 1 − negl(κ) probability.
Proof. By the EUFCMA security of DS, with 1 − negl(κ) probability, a malicious peer will not forge a signed message for some honest peer. In the rest of the proof, we assume that all valid signatures under sk i are indeed generated by pk i . We prove the lemma via the following claim: Claim 1 Let P i , P i be two honest IC peers that have engaged in the BC protocol for P j 's record with inputs b i,j and b i ,j respectively. Then, the direct views of P i , P i for the record of P j when engaging in the BC protocol are such that ifB i,j,p ,B i ,j,p = ⊥, thenB i,j,p andB i ,j,p are both equal to some recordB j,p .
Proof of Claim 1: Assume thatB i,j,p ,B i ,j,p = ⊥. By the description of the Collection phase, whenever an honest peer sets an opinion bit to 0 for some peer, the respective record is set to ⊥. Thus, it holds that b i,j = b i ,j = 1. W.l.o.g., assume thatB i,j,p =B j,p ; we will show thatB i ,j,p =B j,p . We recall that updating a non-⊥ record to a different non-⊥ record is not allowed at Collection phase. By protocol description, P i has setB i,j,p toB j,p due to either one of the following cases: 1. P i = P j , i.e.B i,j,p is the record B i,p that P i has set at the end of the Posting protocol : in this case, P i will eventually receive the message (record, B i,p ), Sig sk j (record, B i,p ) broadcast by P i at the Collection phase. Given that all N c − t c ≥ t c + 1 honest peers will re-broadcast B i,p and that, except from negl(κ) probability, no malicious peer can forge P i 's signature, P i will eventually set d i ,i to t c + 1, and by case (C.1), fix b i ,i = 1 and B i ,j,p =B i ,i,p = B i,p , .
2.B i,j,p was set toB j,p when P i received (record,B j,p ), Sig sk j (record,B j,p ) by peer P j : then P i has re-broadcast this message at the Collection phase, in the format V i,j , Sig sk i (V i,j ) , where V i,j := (view, j), ((record,B i,j,p ), Sig sk j (record,B i,j,p )) . The latter implies that P i has eventually received it and setB i i,j,p ←B j,p . Therefore, since b i ,j = 0, the case (C.2) can not hold, so it must hold thatB i ,j,p =B i,j,p =B j,p . 3.B i,j,p was set toB j,p by checking case (C.1): in this case, the variable d i,j has reached the value t c + 1, i.e., there are at least t c + 1 non-⊥ records in P i 's view must be equal toB j,p . Since there are no more than t c malicious peers, at least one honest peer P k has obtained B j,p , in order to broadcast it at the Collection phase. There are two subcases: 3.1) If P k = P i , then since b i ,j = 0, P i never updated asB i ,j,p ← ⊥ according to (C.2), so it holds thatB i ,j,p =B j,p . 3.2) If P k = P i , then both P i and P i have eventually receivedB j,p at Collection phase (at least by P k ). Therefore, since b i,j = 0 and b i ,j = 0, case (C.2) can not hold, so it must hold thatB i ,j,p =B j,p .
(End of Proof of Claim 1)
By Claim 1, we get that all honest peers agree on each others' records before entering in the Consensus phase. This implies the following facts:
-For each honest peer P k , all honest peers will engage in BC on input 1, thus they will decide on 1, by the validity property. The latter implies that if for some peer P j s.t.B i,j,p = ⊥, but P i decided 0 for P j , then it can safely setB i,j,p ← ⊥, as P j must be malicious. -By the description of the CS Posting protocol (cf. Section 5 and Fig. 6 , every honestly posted item (p, x) requires N c − 2t c ≥ t c + 1 honest peers for receipt generation. Therefore, before entering the Consensus phase all N c − t c honest peers will include (p, x) in their records.
By the above two facts, we have at the Finalization phase, the view of every honest peer P i contains all N c − t c honest peers' records which, in turn contain all honestly posted items for which a receipt has been generated. Therefore, when finalizing its record B i,p the following hold:
-For all honestly posted item (p, x) for which a receipt has been generated, it holds that N i,p (x) ≥ N c − t c ≥ t c + 1. Thus, by case (F.1), P i will add (p, x) in B i,p . -For every item (p,x) s.t. N i,p (x) < t c + 1, P i can safely remove (p,x) according to case (F.2), since N i,p (x) < t c + 1 implies that either (i) (p,x) was maliciously posted, or (ii) a receipt for (p,x) was not generated.
We conclude that for every honestly posted item (p, x) for which a receipt has been generated, every honest IC peer P i , will include (p, x) in B i,p at the end of the Finalization phase, with 1 − negl(κ) probability.
Given Lemma 3, we prove Theorem 2 below
Proof. For θ ≥ ∆ + 3δ + 2N c · T Vf + T Sig + T ShareSig + T Combine , consider an adversary A against θ-Confirmable Liveness, that wins G A,δ,∆,tc,0 θ−C.Live (1 κ , E). Assume that conditions (L.1) and (L.2) of G A,δ,∆,tc,0 θ−C.Live (1 κ , E) must hold. Namely, (L.1). For some honest user U , A provides C with the message (post, U, x) at global time Clock = T , where T is during a period p = [T begin,p , T end,p ], and (L. The validity of the receipt that U computes derives directly from the fact that N c − t c > t s ≥ t c and TSS is (t s , N c )-EUFCMA-secure with 1 − negl(κ) probability.
(L.3.b) can not hold: There is a moment T s.t. for every T ≥ T , (p, x) is included in the view of AB.
To prove this statement, we apply Lemma 3, which states that at the end of the Finalization phase of the Publishing protocol, every honest IC peer P i will include (p, x) in B i,p at the end of the Finalization phase, with 1 − negl(κ) probability. Recall that Lemma 3 holds under the partial synchronicity assumptions considered in the theorem's statement. Therefore, by Lemma 3, we get that at the Publication phase, every honest peer P i will threshold sign and send to AB the message (p, B i,p ), ShareSig(tsk i , (p, B i,p )) that includes the TSS share ShareSig(tsk i , (p, x)) for (p, x). Consequently, AB will receive N c − t c valid TSS shares on (p, x) by the end of period p, so it will (i) add (p, x) to B p , (ii) compute a TSS signature on (p, x) as TSign(tsk, (p, x)) ← Combine pk, pk 1 , . . . , pk Nc , (p, x), (j, σ j ) j∈S and (iii) include TSign(tsk, (p, x)) in the published record ABreceipt[p, B p ] := (p, B p ), TSign(tsk, (p, B p )) .
We conclude that there is a moment T > T end,p s.t. for every T ≥ T , (p, x) is included in the view of AB, defined as the union of the agreed and published BB records preceding the period p that T belongs (therefore also p).
